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Reply to Ms. Marshall's Statement of the Case

Ms. Marshall's remarks concerning the procedural history of this matter
are irrelevant to any of the issues on appeal and misleading. Nevertheless, to set
~

the record straight: The so-called "motion to dismiss" Mr. Card filed in July 2012
was the functional equivalent of an obje~tion to the commissioner's original

.;.a

recommendation entering a Protective Order against him without the benefit of
an evidentiary hearing. [R:49--56]. His prose "motion to vacate minute entry'' filed

.;J

in October and December 2012 asked the judge to reconsider his earlier decision
denying his prose objection to the commissioner's recommendation on

..dJ

procedural grounds. [R:137-138, 156-173]. His prose "motion to vacate void
judgment" was premised on the commissioner committing what Mr. Card
believed was a jurisdictional defect by failing to clearly designate when the Civil
Portion of the Protective Order expired. [R:194-1981.
The only matter that is before this Court is Mr. Card's April 2015 motion to
vacate the Protective Order pursuant to Utah Code 788-7-115(1) after nearly
three (3) years passed since it was originally issued.
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Reply to Ms. Marshall's Arguments

I.

Because the court below based its decision to continue the Protective
Order on a flawed understanding of the legal definition of "abuse/'
its decision constituted an inherent abuse of discretion.

The thrust of Ms. Marshall's argument is that because Utah Code 78B-7115(1) states the court may dismiss a protective order after two years have passed

if she "no longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse," the court had discretion

to keep it in place "indefinitely" regardless of whether she harbored an
objectively reasonable fear of future abuse. That is incorrect. Regardless, because
the lower court's decision to keep the Protective Order was premised on a flawed
11

interpretation of the statutory term abuse" as not being limited to physical
violence - an interpretation Ms. Marshall makes no effort to defend on appeal it's decision would still constitute reversible error even if an "abuse of
discretion,, standard applied because a discrelionary decision tainted by a flawed
legal conclusion constitutes an abuse of that discretion.
A. Even if the statute gave judges a measure of discretion in deciding
whether to vacate a Protective Order in effect for over two years, the trial
court's decision would constitute an abuse of that discretion because it is
premised on a flawed interpretation of the statutory term "abuse."

Even discretionary decisions "must be based on adequate findings of fact
and on the law. A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance,

6

constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, <JI 9, 11 P.3d 277;
See also State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 'jf'jf 14-17 and 47, 127 P.3d 682 ("the abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review will at times necessarily include review to ensure
that no mistakes of law affected a lower court's use of its discretion"); State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991 )("[T]rial courts do not have discretion to
misapply the law. Therefore, legal determinations concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute w h.ich grants the trial court discretion are reviewed
for correctness."); In re Baby B... 2012 UT 35, 'JJ<Il 40-92, 308 P.3d 382 (When
findings are premised on an erroneous legal premise, an appellate court will
ordinarily reverse and remand for reconsideration based on correct legal
principles); Tolman v. Salt Lake Cnty. Atty .• 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991)
("Obviously, the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of
discretion, as is acting unreasonab1y or misinterpreting the law. In essence, a
._i;>

reviewing court never overturns a lower tribunal unless there has been an abuse of
discretion.")( emphasis added).
Here, the court below did not say it was keeping the Protective Order for
reasons independent of whether Ms. Marshall demonstrated a "reasonable fear

...JJ

of future abuse.'' Rather, it based its ruling on the flawed legal conclusion that

7

Mr. Card's conduct constituted a "violation" of the Protective Order therebv.,
satisfying the legal standard for "abuse." [R:392-397]. 1 However, Ms. Marshall
makes little effort to defend that flawed legal premise on appeal. Nor does she
make a meaningful effort to show that the lower court's findings of fact were
adequately detailed to support its legal conclusions.
Consequently, even if an abuse-of-discretion standard applied - and it
does not - this Court should reverse and remand for reconsideration because the
trial court's judgment was tainted by a flawed legal conclusion. Ms. Marshall
makes no meaningful effort to show the court below would have reached the
same conclusion if it applied the correct statutory definition of "abuse."
B. Read as a whole, the statute presumes a Protective Order between a
divorcing couple should be dismissed at the time of their divorce absent
a showing that the petitioner harbors a reasonable fear of future abuse.

As Ms. Marshall acknowledges, the primary duty in interpreting statutes is
to give effect to the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the plain wording of
the statute. However, a plain language analysis is not limited to "individual

In response to Mr. Card's specific request for guidance as to what
conditions he could fulfill to have the Protective Order dismissed, the trial court
answered "time" and "some behavior that would alleviate Ms. Marshall's fear."
(R:550]. In the context of the court's ruling, the only "fear" it could have been
referring to would be a fear of future ''abuse" as it interpreted that term.
8

words and subsections in isolation." Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53,

<Jr

11, 250 P.3d

994. "[R]ather, statutory interpretation requires that each part or section be

construed in connection with every over part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole." Id.
App1ying these principles to Utah Code 78B-7-115(1), it is apparent from a
plain reading of the statute the Legislature did not intend to give trial courts
unfettered discretion in deciding whether to keep or vacate a protective order
once two years had passed. Rather, the statute expressly directs the court to
"determinfe] whether the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of future
abuse" -meaning "physical harm" under Section 78B-7-102(1)- and lists various
factors to consider in making that determination. Read in context, the statutory
vJJ

term "may" is best interpreted as giving the court jurisdiction to set aside what
would otherwise be a final order subject to res judicata regardless of the passage

...J

of time and intervening changed circumstances. Macris & Assoc. Inc. v. Neways,
Inc., 2000 UT 93, <J[ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (explaining litigants normally cannot re-

·~

litigate previously decided claims once the court enters a final judgment).
Nothing in the statute states or implies a trial court may arbitrarily refuse to
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dismiss the Protective Order even if it finds the petitioner does not harbor an
objectively reasonable fear of future abuse.
Indeed, recently enacted Utah Code 78B--7-115(5) states that "[i]f a divorce
proceeding is pending between parties to a protective order action, the protective
order shall be dismissed when the court issues a divorce decree" if the petitioner
was given notice of both actions and the court finds the order need not continue
because "the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse."
Logically, because parties to a divorce are always subject to a divorce decree the
court can address any concerns between them in that decree. And it can modify
or clarify it as needed to address future issues. In this context, a Protective Order
becomes a drastic solution in search of a problem that can be remedied through
less drastic means thereby enabling both parties to move on with their lives.
II.

Under Civil Rule 108, a trial judge cannot adopt findings" made by a
commissioner unless admissible evidence presented to the judge
independently confirms those findings.
11

Under the plain language of Utah R. of Civ. P. 108(f), when a judge
conducts an evidentiary hearing in response to an objection to a commissioner's
recommendation "[t]he judge will make independent findings of fact and
conclusions of law based on the evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or

10

exhibit, presented to the judge ... " (emphasis added). Will" is a mandatory term
11

~-

leaving no room for discretion. And the plain meaning of the word
"independent" is unot relying on something else." Merriam-Webster Dictionary
(6 th Ed.). Thus, a judge cannot rely upon findings made by the commissioner

unless admissible evidence "presented to the judge" at an evidentiary hearing
''independent[ly ]" confirms those findings.
A. Ms . Marshall failed to present admissible evidence to the judge to
support her prior proffer to the commissioner.

Although Ms. Marshall claims all the information cited in the Judge's
adoption of the commissioner's findings "had been discussed i.n prior hearings,.,
and was "readily ascertainable," she fails to provide any citation to the record
where she presented admissible evidence to the judge supporting her claim
about an alleged extortion attempt, request for disparagement of a now-retired
commissioner, or a Bar complaint against her counsel. See Utah R. of App. P.
24(a)(9)(Explaining an adequately briefed argument must contain citations to
parts of the record relied upon). Nor does she deny her stipu1ation that all the
"charges" referenced in the commjssioner's findings had been dropped or
dismissed. [R:392, 492-493, 518, 529].

11

The mere fact she raised these allegations in her attorney's proffer to the
commissioner did not convert it into admissible evidence at a subsequent
hearing before the judge. See Utah R. of Civ. P. 43 (explaining "in all trials, the
testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court'' subject to the Utah
Rules of Evidence), 108(d)(2)(explaining parties are entitled to an evidentiary
hearing when objecting to a commissioner's recommendation in a protective
order matter), and 108(f); Cf. Stan Katz Heal Estate, Inc. v. Chavez_, 565 P.2d 1142,
1143-44 (Utah 1977)(while judges have discretion to hear ordinary motions using
proffers and affidavits, it is improper to resolve factual disputes on that basis).
Contrary to Ms. Marshall's assertions, each of those allegations was
specifically controverted by Mr. Card in the pleadings. [R: 263-268, 281-294].
Because for whatever reason Ms. Marshall opted not to present any admissible
evidence to support them to the Judge at their evidentiary hearing, there was
nothing for Mr. Card to refute. Nor was there anything for the judge to rely upon
in making his decision. The trial court was certainly free to weigh and make
findings based upon the admissible evidence in.dependently presented to it. But, under
Civil Rule 108(£) it was not free to make findings outside that record.
Consequently, such unsupported findings should be disregarded as clearly

12

erroneous or at least inadequately detailed. Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 724725 (Utah App. 1994)(A finding of fact not supported by admissible evidence is
clearly erroneous and wilJ be disregarded on appeal).

B. Even if it were permissible for the judge to rely upon the
commissioner's findings - and it is not- Ms. Marshall's argument that
such findings support the judge's decision is inadequately briefed.
Regardless, even if this Court were to overlook the fact such findings were
unsupported by admissible evidence, such would not be a basis for affirming the
judge's decision. While Mr. Card's litigation strategy prior to obtaining counsel
may have been ill-advised, Ms. Marshall makes no effort to explain how it would
give her a reasonable fear of "future abuse" justifying an ongoing Protective
Order {with all its collateral legal consequences) as opposed to a narrowly
tailored order curtailing unnecessary Htigation under Utah R. of Civ. P. 83.
Likewise, she does not explain why a Protective Order is needed to resolve

ongoing parent-time disputes when their divorce court ordered them to use
ACAFS for parent-time exchanges going forward and there have not been any
--..u

problems with exchanges since then.
In Broderick v. Apartment Mgt. ConsuH .• LI .C our Supreme Court granted

...,i;

a reversal without reaching the merits of the issues presented for review where,

13

as here, the appellant came forward with a plausible basis for reversal which the
appellee fai1ed to meaningful refute in its opposition brief. 2012 UT 17,279 P.3d
391. The Court explained that under Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
both appellant and appellee are expected to meaningfully brief and analyze the
issues before the court. Id. 'Il<Jl 9-10. Appellate courts are "not simply a depository
in which [either] party may dump the burden of argument and research" and
will not "assume a party's burden of argument and research." Id.<[ 9. While
recognizing that appellants bear the initial burden of persuasion on appeal, once
they have met that burden it is incumbent upon the appellee to refute those
arguments. Id. 119. Otherwise, an appellate court is justified in refusing to
consider an inadequately briefed argument on the part of the appellees and may
reverse on that basis. Id. ~111-12, 14, 18-20.
Here, as in Broderick. Ms. Marshall's arguments are inadequately briefed.
She cites no statute, court rule, or caselaw giving the judge power to rely upon
claims proffered to the commissioner that were not presented to the judge and
were otherwise controverted in the pleadings. Ms. Marshall makes no effort to
refute Mr. Card's analysis that his complained-of conduct did not constitute a
violation of the Protective Order. Nor would it give someone a reasonable fear of

14

"future abuse" as our Legislature defines that term. Consequently, this Court is
justified in refusing to consider her inadequately briefed argument and tacit
invitation to assume her burden of argument and research.
III.

The trial court's fee award was erroneous because it was premised on
a flawed legal conclusion.

Notably, the attorney fees provisions in Utah Code 78B-7-115(3) are
contained in the "Dismissal of Protective Order" section of the Cohabitant Abuse
Act and not as an independent section of the Act. When read in context with the
entirety of Section 78B-7-115 dealing with proceedings to dismiss a Protective
Order, it is apparent that attorney fees are only permissible if the court finds
either party acted in bad faith or with intent to harass or intimidate the other
party in the context of moving to dismiss a Protective Order.
However, while the trial court thought some of Mr. Card's actions were
disconcerting and annoying, it did not and could not find that he brought his
motion to vacate the Protective Order in bad faith or with the intent of
harassment or intimidation in excess of the inherent unpleasantness of litigation.
Although Ms. Marshall protests Mr. Card engaged in a "long and
disturbing pattern" of "provocative" and "abusive', behavior such as direct
depositing or having a process server deliver his court-ordered child support
15

payments to her, nowhere in her brief does she argue such conduct constituted a
violation of the Protective Order. Nor does she make any meaningful effort to
show how such conduct would give someone an objectively reasonable fear of
"abuse" as the statute defines that term.
Because the trial court's decision to award fees was premised upon a
flawed legal conclusion, its resulting decision constituted an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
While Mr. Card and Ms. Marshall's divorce was unpleasant, contentious,
and involved disconcerting behavior at times, none of Mr. Card's complained-of
actions rose to the level of "abusive" conduct or a "violation" of the Protective
Order. Because the trial court's decision to keep the Protective Order was
premised on its flawed legal conclusion that Mr. Card's conduct constituted
"abuse" - a legal determination Ms. Marshall makes little to no effort to defend
on appeal - its decision must be reversed.
Additionally, this Court would be justified in reversing the trial court's
judgment because Ms. Marshall's arguments are inadequately briefed. This court
is not a depository she is free to dump her burden of argument and research
upon and will not assume that burden for her.
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Respectfully submitted:
DA TED THIS 2nd day of June, 2016.

Scott Wiser, Counsel for Appellant

Certificate of Compliance with Utah R. of App. P. 24(f)(t)(A)

Counsel certifies that this brief complies with the word limitations in Utah
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exempted by f(l)(B), according to the Microsoft Word 2010 program used by
counsel.
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